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1Introduction
fble paper la an exposition of George Berkeley1 s 
theory of space and extension based upon an examin­
ation of the Oommonplaee Book (written in 1705-8), 
an essay Of Infinites {written olr* 1706}, Jin .ffsaaff, 
towards .a Hew theory. of vision {first published in 
1709)0 A tgreatla,a„ Congemim the Principles of Human 
Knowledge {first published .in 1710), Be Moth (first 
published in 1721)# and Siria (first published In
n
1744)* fhe strictly mathematical works are omitted 
In accordance with the emphasis of this discussion*
Wo specific reference to fhrae Dialogues between 
Evlaa .and PMlonoua is included, since the works 
discussed Incorporate all the pertinent material 
found in this popularisation of Berkeley*s theory* 
Although most of Berkeley's ideas -concerning 
space and extension are mentioned in the Common 
place Book* certain of them are given particular 
attention in one or more of the other writings# 
fhe result is sometimes confusing, since Berkeley, 
in order to bring home some particular point, may 
neglect to explain its full bBpfieations#
All references are to Fraser*e edition of Berkeley's 
Works (Oxford, 1901), 4 vols* by volume and page#
2For example, the purpose of the Theory of Vision 
is *«.*«» to shew to whet maimer we perceive by Sight 
the Distance,, Magnitude, and Situation of objects* * * 
But Berkeley also uses the Theory of Vision as a 
gentle introduction to 'the theory that the objects 
of knowledge are simply ideas to the mind and have 
no existence external to it*.
This produces some awkwardness, since Berkeley 
attempts- to show that vision had no external object 
but speaks continually to this assay as though 
knowledge of an external object were given through 
the sense of touch, even though It is apparent that 
the argument# urged against the existence of an 
external visual object might be applied with equal 
force against the existence of an external tactual 
object#
This ambiguity is excused to the Principles 
on the ground that the Theory of Vision deals with 
vision only and that clarity and simplicity of 
presentation -demand that a discussion of external 
tactual objects be omitted to that placeApparently 
Berkeley thought it better to present his theory of
2I. 12V.
31, 280.
idealism a little at a time in order to insure for 
it a better reception# Hemsrks in the Qomonplaee 
Book indicate that he was careful to leave certain 
things unsaid for fear of prejudicing the reader 
against future writings* The discrepancy mentioned 
does not proceed, then, from a modification of ideas 
but merely from the mode of presentation*
This paper attempts to present Berkeley1 a mature 
views on space and extension, avoiding, such ambiguities 
as that mentioned* C on& eqiiently it seems better to 
bring the ideas in the different works together into 
a coherent unit rather than to adhere to a strictly 
chronological treatment* In fact # basically there 
seems to have been little development ih Berkeley * a 
space theory after the Commonplace Book, since all 
of the essential points are stated there from sub­
stantially the same viewpoint found in later works*
An exception to this is the short treatment of the 
relation of Bod and apace in Birds* Consequently 
I have dealt with this material to a separate section* 
The major questions to be discussed are: Cl) Are 
there external apace and extension existing independ­
ently of.mindsf (2 ) Are there such things as abstract
4space and extension? (3) Is there such a thing, as 
absolute apace or is space relative? 14) What Is the 
character of mathematical space?
fhe topical summary will serve as'a more com* 
pie to outline*
throughout this paper the tern ^extension” will 
mean the particular extension of physical objects* 
0pace will mean pure* absolute space in Itself* 
what Berkeley sometimes refers to. as ^expansion1** 
unless otherwise specified* Space will be diatin* 
guiahed further into absolute* Infinite apace* 
meaning pure space In Itself* and relative or finite 
space* which exists between particular things and 
which is measured by or occupied by them*
sThe Character of Qualities and Matter to General
Berkeley1a refutation of the existence of 
absolute and external space and extension rests 
■partly on the general disproof of the existence of 
external, bodies.* Consequently it is necessary to 
say something about ideas and qualities to general 
before going on to discuss the special questions 
of space and extension*
(a) Spirits -and Ideas 
Berkeley distinguishes spirits and idea©-as 
the only things which exist* . Spirits are to be 
considered as “active* indivisible incorruptible 
substancesw* Being simple and one they -are the
only cause of things* because they alone are active*. 
“Spirit as it pereelves is called the understanding 
and as it produces or otherwise operates on ideas 
is called the willn*2 Consequently it* rather than 
ideas, which can cause nothing Is the true cause of
3
all things* “Ideas are inert perishable passions 
or dependent beings* which subsist not by themselves 
but are supported by , or exist to, minds or spiritual
1I. 307.
2I. 272.
SX. 270, 275, 314.
64
substances1** Motion, like all other ideas, is
jKj
properly inert so ttto endeavour to- explain tlx©
produo t ion o f colors by figure, motion, or-mag*
nltnd© is to labour in vaintf»® Sine© spirit and
•ideas are the only things that exist, the die*-
tinction between substance and mode is nnintelli*
7
gSble* Qualities could not be modes of spirit be*
cause, for example, extension la an idea existing
only' in spirit|- and consequently, spirit could not..
©
have extension .as an attribute or mode;*
(b) Primary Qualities are in the Mind.
In the Principles Berkeley attempts to show 
that primary, as well as secondary , qualities 
exist only In the mind# From this it follows that, 
since all qualities are Ideas in the mind- and since 
physical objects are simply groups of qualities, 
physical objects exist -only in the mind, this la
important, since on© argument for the existence of
* ' !
4I* 307,
5I, 071-2,
6I. 314,
1. 284,
8 •
1. 285,
7absolute* external space la that it is necessary as a 
place for the existence and motion of bodies which are 
assumed to exist independent If of mind and external to it* 
Disprove the externality of physical objects, and 
their motion and the necessity for .an external' space 
la' removed together with objective extension#
$he principal arguments presented are the fol­
lowing :
Cl) Extension* figure* and motion abstracted 
from all other qualities- are unimaginable* Every idea 
of an extended body is associated with some color 
or some other sense quality- which is acknowledged to 
exist- only in .the mind, and where the color is, there 
also must be* the extension and the, other primary 
qualities*^
(2 ) Every argument used to show that color and 
the other secondary qualities do not exist in an. 
external object may be applied to extension, figure,
. *  »>«o» “  «w . . ^  - 1  e « .  rel-
ativlty of sense perception may be used equally well 
to* disprove the externality of primary qualities*
For example, ” ♦ ♦ * * «/great and small, swift and alow
nrr-T.-r J-T.—m r f  "rni —n r  nciiirii. r -n ^ ir a ^ r ; - r r f r tr  Vi r r . iln nrun- - ------------------------------------------- -- --------------- ------r -^tirf   r- r r -  r r r  r-~—^r.rr-— >■ !■-■■ ■" ■ ■    
01* 263*
10I. 59, 265-6,
are allowed to exist nowhere without' the mind| being-
* ' * ' * r * ¥•
entirely relative .and changing as the frame or position 
of .the organa of sens© varies* fhe extension therefore 
which exists without the mind is neither great nor small, 
..........that Is,.*.,,nothing at all".*1
fheae arguments do not show that extension and 
color do not exist in an external object hut simply
that we do not know by our senses which appearance
*
of an object is its true one*
is) .toother argument shows that it is impossible
for any sensible quality to exist outside the mind*3,2
to idea is defined as wany sensible or Imaginable 
 ^ 13
thing** £ 1 1 sensible qualities are alike sensations
and alike real and, being Ideas, can exist only in
M  ’ 7 -
the'Bind*' therefore color, figure, extension, and
all other qualities, whether primary or secondary ,
are equally in the mind,*
l:LI. 263*
265.
13I. 47.
14I. 512,
15X. 262,
9(c) Bo %ternal Objects or ^latter1*'
Pilose who assume that qualities are external 
to the mind commonly suppose the® to exist to an 
external ^matter11 of which they are the properties# 
Berkeley specifically attacks the notion of such an 
external matter to the abstract apart from sensible 
appearances and shows that, since external objects do 
not exist, there Is no reason for supposing the 
existence of external qualities* toe arguments are 
the following i
(1 ) If there were external objects we could
know of 'them only through either sense or reason*
•; * •. \ •
But sense gives us knowledge of only sensations or
those things that .are ’immediately present to the 
senses and does not inf orm us that things exist 
outside the mind* tod we can not reason out the 
externality of bodies since even the advocates of 
that view admit that there is no necessary connection
. . .  ig
between ideas and -external things* Moreover, if
there were external bodies we could never know of
*
them, for a person affected with cdrtate ideas but 
not from, an external body would have as much reason
16 *
I* 268*
10
to believe the ideas proceeded from an external 
body as a parson who actually received similar 
Ideas fro m a body that really existed external 
to him*^
(2 )  The absolute existence of sensible objects
in themselves or independent and outside of the
mind is either meaningless or else a direct con- 
18
tradletton* We have no positive idea of a sub*
stratum supporting extension or any other quality and
consequently we can not speak meaningfully of such a 
19substratum# Moreover* all ideas are "visibly in*
active"* Their very nature implies passivity and
it is impossible for an idea to do anything or*
strictly speaking* to cause anything* nor can it
go
resemble an active being#' How matter can operate
on spirit no philosopher can explain.21 Hone© object-
ive extension# figure# and motion can not be the cause 
of our sensations* To say that they are the effect 
of powers resulting fro®- "the configuration# number#
27
I* 268*
18I. 270.
19
I. 268, 295*
20I. 270-1. 
glI. 285.
11
motion, and also of corpuscles* {as book© suggests)
must be false, for figure, extension, and motion,are
22ideas and exist In the mind only*
(d) fh© £rue Object of Bens©
Since be has attacked the notion of external 
bodies, Berkeley is confronted with the question 
of the true nature of the objects of sense* B© 
concludes that a sensory object Is nothing but the 
combination of such sensations as color, etc*, non© 
of which can be supposed to exist unperceived*83 
All that really is contained in the idea ^matter* 
are the positive ideas of extension, figure, solid** 
ity, and motion* fhere is no underlying substrate 
nor need there be, for it la no more absurd to sup­
pose accidents without a substance than to- suppose
24substance without. accidents* Matter la only a 
group of Ideas in the mind* fher© is no inert, ex­
tended matter out aid© of the mind* T h eve is no
25matter that is unpercelvefele*
22
i* 2 6 2, am*
23
X* 313*
24I» 295.
25I. 295-6.
\
12
Since the objects of sense a r e in the mind,
it is unnecessary to assume the existence of
an external space as their locus# furthermore 9
h j the same reasoning! there is no necessity for
external extension# External extension assumes the
existence of external matter# Hie latter is false
26and hence the former is also*
P6
1* 208t 300*
23
Ho External Space or Extension
M s  section deals with Berkeley la specific 
denial of the externality of extension in particular* 
fhe attack upon the external existence of qualities 
and matter .includes -in general form most of the 
arguments which follow* Ihose arguments as directed 
particularly against the externality of extension 
appear In the Ooimnonplaee Book 4 where Berkeley was 
formulating- his metaphysics# It seems reasonable 
that the general attack on external primary qualities 
was prompted by* and was an outgrowth of, the con­
sideration of extension* Berkeley had to dispose of 
the Cartesian belief in matter as that which is ex­
tended sine© extension was probably the quality that
would be held most 'tenaciously to exist outside the 
1
mind# '
(a) Arguments Against External Extension 
In the Commonplace Book Berkeley is already 
certain that no extension, either risible or tan­
gible, exists outside the mind, although the Iheory 
of Vigiqa appears to ddny externality to visual
I. ,50.
14
extension alone# M  previously suggested,, this ap­
parent discrepancy arises from Berkeley’s technique 
of presentation rather than from, any change in 
his theory#
Extension may be said to be ,!outsideff the 
mind only in a special sense, that is. In ao far 
as it is Independent of the will or is distinct from 
the mind* While it may be independent of a particular 
human will, however, it must, being an idea, be de­
pendent upon some will or mind, although it is no
2property of mind, since mind can exist without it.
People imagine extension to be an inert property
o f unthinking substance and not in. the mind because
3
It is not accompanied, by pleasure or pain, because 
it is perceived in common by two senses, and be-
4,cause of ignorance of the laws of optics* ~ But ex­
tension can not exist outside the mind for a variety 
5of reasonss
\
(1 ) The existence of extension outside the
Z
i* m *
*SL
It 31*
4
It 6 2.
5
I* 57*
15
mind implies the contradictory notion that that 
which Is known may ho a property of the unknown^
It is argued that the idea of extension is not in 
an mthlhking matter hut that it is like something 
in that matter* But one can not imagine what that 
something would he# An unperceived perception is
7
a self-contradiction#
(2) Extension is a sensation and therefore must
he in the mind# If ..there were a solid# extended
substance the mind -would-not and could not he
acquainted with it for it perceives V# * # only the
impressions made upon its brain# or rather the ideas
« 8attending these impressions *■
{3) Extension can not be conceived without 
tangible or visible qualities and so must be in the 
mind where those qualities are# Berkeley refers to 
this as the "chief argument" against external ex**' 
tension.9
(4) Another argument apparently aimed particularly 
at the Cartesian notion of extension as the defining
6X# 80#
7I* 8S-3.
A
X* 63.
9X. 81.
property of matter occurs in the Principles* 1^
there is an external matter which is infinitely
divisible^ . as science claims,, then each body is
infinitely extended and void of all shape and
figure and each particle of matter is infinite and
shapeless* This" is absurd and self-contradictory,
ao it must he that the mind ^frames all that
»
variety of bodies which compos© the visible world,
anyone whereof does not exist longer than it is 
10perceived** ' Consequently matter considered in the 
usual scientific sense could not exist outside the 
mind and It Is useless to suppose extension to be 
external*
Berkeley has little to say directly about 
the IntemaXity of space* This is because, as will 
be shown, later, the only space he recognises is 
space as relative to extended objects* IxtemaX 
space, then, would be disproved by the disproof of 
external extension* This question will be considered 
further in the discussion of the perception of 
space based on the Theory. of Vision* However, the 
Commonplace Book presents the argument that there could
1 0
I* 285*
be no space outside the mind* since space is an idea
in the mind and without the mind there would he
11uniform nothing, ' ■
(b) Arguments Against Abstract Extension 
Several arguments against the existence of 
an abstract general idea of extension are stated 
in the QarmonttlBCB Book, Here* as elsewhere*
M . r
Berkeley insists that' there are no abstract ideas 
of any .kind* but the notes which constitute this 
work indicate a preoccupation with extension# 
the ,fgreat argument** is that extension can 
not be imagined abstracted from sensible qualities
tg
such as those of touch and vision#- 11 We can no more
have an idea of length without' breadth or visibility
14than of a general figure**" lockets ^general
*
triangle* is shown in the Brinelnles to be no ■ true 
idea on the same ground *- that when we consult ex­
perience we find that we have no abstract idea of 
ISextension* Extension considered in the abstract 
11
1* 65*
IS
I. 7.
1SI, 10, 81.
14-X# X t »
151. 38, 246.
represent a no idea and is merely a word#'
3?here is a great' difference between considering
length without breadth and haring an idea of it or
imagining it*^ lines and points conceived as ter**
minations are different from lines and points con**
iseelved 1 absolutelyn $ for terminations of surfaces,
#* 19that iSj figures., *are not imaginable per se »
*
Extension is not conceived in itself apart fram  
other sensible qualities, because a. mere line not 
made up of points can not be imagined and hence does 
not exist.20 Moreover, everything perceived Is a 
particular and extension can not be separated or
abstracted from particular things#
#■
T he The cry of Vision reiterates the argument 
that a line devoid of sensible qualities is un~ 
imaginable and shows that a general extension, such 
as a general triangle la a contradiction since it 
must be at once large and small, oblique■ and
10
2%
rectangular# etc**
fixe arguments just stated depend chiefly
upon the nntoaginabllity of general extension
hut- contain certain rational elements! as in the
argument concerning the general triangle# Hot
only are we unable to imagine abstract extension
but we are even unable to conceive it* Abstract**
ing extension brings us into "extravagances* and
.paradoxes such as n* # * * that the fire is not hot#
22
n o r the wall white***#11* The f a u l t lies in a two**.
fold errors
Cl) fhe supposition that extension (or any
other quality) may be abstracted from all sen*
sible qualities*
{B) fhe supposition that the entity extension
23can be abstracted from its being perceived.#'
(c) Criticism of the "Great Argument11 
Berkeley has referred several times to the 
"great argument" against extension being outside 
the -mini* fhts argument may be taken in two parts 
which are respectively rational and empiric all
21I. 187-9,
22 _X. 312#
23t <5A.* vMUS*
20
(X) It .has been stated that the only things 
which exist are active■spirits and passive ideas$ 
the latter, by their very nature, capable of 
existing only in mlnda or spirits, therefore, 
extension, not being a spirit, must exist in the 
mind# tThat it should exist elsewhere is rationally 
inconceivable,
3h my opinion this argument fails to show that 
nothing can exist except spirits and ideas* ^hat we 
can conceive of nothing -else does not bar the exist­
ence of something else# Even if we agree that Mosse 
est int0lligin the argument is unsatisfactory, 
Berkeley assumes that a division of things into £bat 
which thinks and that which is thought of is
04
exhaustive of the universe# This is a serious 
fallacy# fhe disjunction should be between things 
thought of and things not thought of or between 
tilings which think and things which do not think*
It seems to be Berkeley* s .intention to apply the 
second disjunction, but, if so, what objection 
could there be to thinking of something that thinks? 
We might even apply the criterion of reality to
24- 'I, 10,
21
minds and say t h a t a mind, is real if it is thought 
of*
(2 ) But Berkeley tries to establish M s  point 
by an empirical trial* Me defines reality or
<r>er
existence, as being perceived# wThe existence of 
oar ideas consists in being perceived* imagined* 
thought o n n%®9 Hence* if the idea of extension 
is not perceived* then extension does not exist* 
tEhat is* it must h e perceived -by some mind in order 
for it to be real* Reasoning about things of which 
we have no idea is both absurd and impossible*^ 
Examination of our ideas will convince us that we 
have idea of either external or abstract ex­
tension#
in summary then* since external extension 
is not perceived and can not be logically conceived 
h y the human mind* it has no existence or reality*
But so far it is still possible that other minds 
than ours might be able to entertain an idea of 
abstract. extension which would be external to our minds*
g 5 -r ^X# 10*
26fi* m 1"1* Xo#
(c) C&i&eyia of Heality 
2 have stated that pare ©inability is ^ e r k e lo y * s 
criterion of the reality of ideas 3 but other defin­
itions- of reality are given* In the Principles 
ideas printed on t h e  m ind by God are called real* ^  
Still another meaning is given to reality - that of 
vividness* Ideas of sense are said to be more strong* 
lively* and distinct than those of Imagination and 
have a distinctive steadiness and order* ”tS?hey are 
allowed 'to have more reality in thorn - that is* to 
be more strong* lively* and coherent than creatures
of the rated* but this is no argument that they erist
##outside the mind1 * " Several possible criteria* then* 
present themselves I
Cl) Being perceived,
(2) Production from a source outside the human
mind*
(3) Clarity* strength* liveliness* and steadiness#
(4) Coherence with other ideas*
To these may be added logical conceivability unless 
coherence is taken, to me an this#
23
Berkeley appears to consider perception to 
be the true test for the reality of things, hut, 
aa we have seen, -an idea May he rejected as non­
existent because it ia logically inconceivable*
To be is to be understood as well as to be per­
ceived* Berkeley does not enforce this distinction 
as consistently as could he desired and frequently 
even uses the t©m ^conceive11 when he obviously 
means ^perceive1** In any case we can not recon­
cile either criterion with the notion that there 
are degrees of reality and will not take the other 
criteria suggested seriously*
So far Berkeley has been denying the existence 
of external matter and external space and extension 
on the ground that they are neither conceived nor 
perceived by the human mind* But to say that these 
■entities are beyond human knowledge is not to say 
that they have existence in no mind whatsoever*
The possibility of such existence will be discussed 
in another part of this paper*
mAbsolute Space
toe existence of absolute apace might he 
urged as a place for absolute motion* If there 
la -absolute motion there must be absolute apace* 
Berkeleyfs discussion of the perception of space 
in the toeory of vision shows that we only know 
relative space* However, he spends considerable 
time on a direct attack on the notions of absolute 
space and absolute motion*
la) Kewton’s Space and Motion
lewton $ of course was the chief scientific
authority of the time so Berkeley turns to
Principle and finds that?
*** * ime, Space* and Motion are distinguished 
iuto absolute and relative. true and apparent* 
mathematical and vulgar £ which distinct ion* *»* * 
does'suppose those "qualities to have an 
existence without the minds -and that they 
are ordinarily conceived with relation to 
sensible things* to which nevertheless to 
their* own nature, they bear no' relation at 
all11 *
lewton* according to Berkeley, also states that?
(I)*?** there is an absolute Space, which, being 
unperceivable to the sense.' reratos in itself 
similar and immoveablej .and relative Space to- 
be the measure thereof, which* being moveable
XI. 319,
26
and defined by its situation in respect of 
sensible bodies, 1$ taken vulgarly for 
immoveable space**# *
{gl^Absolute Motion is said to be the translation 
of a bo% from absolute place to absolute 
place, as reiativej&obion is from one relative 
place' to another11#0
(3}wihi& because the parts of absolute space do 
not fall under our' senses, instead of them 
we are obliged to use .their sensible'measures! 
and so define both place and motion with 
respect to bodies which are regarded as 
. immoveable'**.#
Cb) Ho Absolute Motion 
In the Commonplace Book Berkeley is already
speculating how to reconcile Hewton* s two types
sof motion with his c m  doctrine? Here he points 
out that even if the. existence of external bodies 
is assumed,; it is still impossible for us to know 
that any body is absolutely at rest or in motion, 
* since that supposing ideas much slower than at 
present, bodies now apparently moving wd then be 
apparently at rest",6
®I. 319.
3I. 319. *
4I. 319.
5I. 60.
61. 60-1,
26
Hie m ove pertinent arguments appear in the 
Principles.  ^where it is held that there- can he no 
absolute motion*. because we have no idea of it 
and can not conceive of its
(1) Inhere can be only relative motion since 
two bodies are necessary for there to be any motion 
at all# "This seems evident* in that the idea 1
ry
have of motion doth necessarily include relation*15 
An examination of the ideas present to our minds 
shows that no one conceives motion differently*
(2) But when two bodies com© nearer together 
it is possible that only one is in motion since 
that one moves which has had force impressed upon 
it* ^Motion Includes a relation of one thing to 
another yet it is not necessary that each term of 
the relation be denominated from it*
{3) T,As the place happens to be variously 
defined* the motion which is related to 
it varies* A man to a ship may be said 
to be quiescent with relation to the 
aides of the vessel* yet move with relation 
to the land*1
7I, 320*
8I. 320. 
9I* 321.
mWe find on examination that wo have no real
idea of absolute motion hut only oho of relative
motion with -the utmost walls* of a finite 'universe
as fixed points of reference. At least from a human
10
..point of view, absolute motion is Incomprehensible*.
Berkeley aeems to have made difficulty for
himself in adopting the' assertion of Mewton that
for-a body to be moved two tilings are necessary s
first, change in distance with regard to another
body, and,, second, that the force occasioning the
11change be applied to it# taking this view Berkeley 
is able to say that a lone body with vis, impreaaa 
would not have motion unless other bodies were pro* 
sent to define the position#^
fro objections to this are -'apparent# first, 
it is obvious that- we would be unable to tell by 
observation which of two bodies was in motion, that 
is, which had vie Imnreaaa* Second, force is a con­
cept which implies motion* Force, in Berkeley's 
system, can only have meaning as it refers to sen­
sible effects which are exhibited and observed in 
motion#
10
X* 321.
11 *£Ollmm O&Jbm
*®I, 322*
* 2B
Force is only definable to terms of motion* either 
absolute or relative, and could not he impressed upon 
a body without producing motion* or* at any1 rate* 
could not he known to he impressed upon a “body (which 
for Berkeley is the same thing) without motion being 
present end known*
fc) Hewtonto Ikpirieai Proof of Absolute Motion^ 
Wewtoato Principle presents an. empirical proof 
for absolute motion and Berkeley refutes this to 
the QtamonpiaOe Bookf to the Principles > and at 
greater length to Be Motu»- toe proof consists to 
an experiment to which a bucket of water is suspended 
from a rope which has been twisted so that the bucket
will rotate when released* Before the bucket is
* %
released the water is at rest to relation to It*
After it has been released the bucket revolves and 
the water is to motion to relation to it* But 
after some time the water begins to rotate at the 
same speed as the bucket and is at rest to relation
ISHewtonts discussion appears to the Scholium to 
Def inition W11X' of Brineipla ^ thematlcar" fOTmrr
to It* However* the surface of the water has assumed
ah angle from the center* and this -angle*. Hewton holds*
is ah Indie at ion of the absolute motion of the water*
Berkeley shows that the creation of the vortex
may as well be interpreted in terns of relative motion
as in terms of absolute motion even though the water
and the bucket are at rest in relation, to one another*
for other points of reference such as the earth must 
. 14be- considered*
<&) Bo Absolute Space 
Berkeley concludes his argument by stating 
that the philosophic consideration of motion does 
not imply the existence of an absolute space distinct 
from, that which is perceived by the sense and related 
to bodies| and that it is clear such a space can 
not exist outside the mind on the same arguments 
used to deny the externality of other objects of 
sense* Moreover* ^motion is proportional to 
space described in a given time and time is 
relative* Motion* therefore* would be doubly relative*.
14I* 12 * 321**2 * D*M* sec* 3G***64* 
1SI. 67.
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fhus# Is© causa w© do not and can not naira .ait Idea
of absolute motion* it is unnecessary to assume
the existence of absolute space* of which we ©an. have
;
idea*.
{©) Mo Abstract Idea of Space 
Just as we haire no abstract Idea of extension 
so we can not frame the idea of pure -space ©xclus-
10ire of all body* for this is a most abstract idea*
Attempts to abstract pure space lead to- difficulties
and contradictions* whereas particular finite apace
and place are readily Intelligible*
"Bid your servant meet you at such a time* 
in such a- place and he shall never stay to 
deliberate on the meaning of these words***#.
But It will gravel a philosopher to Imow 
what is meant by time In the abstract##*”
What is said here of time is equally applicable
to space*
We have:/ then* no idea of pure space* Our 
Men of' empty space is "the sensuous idea of 
'unresisted motion1*' dependent upon the sensations 
of the limbs (the..kinesthetic sense)* If these
ieT *20^ ■JL« 0*50#
17
I* 311#
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sensations were absent there would be no idea
ISof empty space# ‘ Aa will be shown in the discussion
' of space based oh the''Theory of ,Vision. the ideas of
■space are not got from seeing but from touch and the 
10muscle sense* ' It should be noted that the idea 
of empty apace- is dependent cm motion* the sensuous 
idea of unresisted motion, which is a relative idea* 
Hence the idea of empty apace is also relative* But 
we, have no idea, of space- abstracted from sensuous' 
<gualltfee*
18I* 383*
19I. 323.
How We Ferceive Space and Extension
fhe talk of the Wheory of Vision deale with 
the problem of how apace and extension are per­
ceived and at the same time suggests certain 
ideas concerning the nature- of these entities:#;
In summarising this discussion it Is practically 
impossible to separate the philosophical from the
CaJ Distance 
begins with the assumption that 
^outness*1 or distance from the point of vision 
Is not seen Immediately* -Such distance, ^heing 
a line endwise to the eye, it projects only one 
point to the fund of the eye* which point remains 
invariably the same, whether the distance be longer 
or shorter# ^  fills is generally accepted for 
far objects, whose distance is conceded to be known 
only by experience which makes use of such cues as
o
aerial perspective and intervening objects#
H ,  127.
2x* iea .
S3
Hear distance* however* is generally held 
to he imom by noting the necessary connection
between the angle of the optic axis and the die**' 
tanee or outness of the object* or else by the
#X
greater or leas divergence of the rays on the ©ye*
Berkeley denies that either of these is true*
Heither the distance nor the optic angle is seen 
4directly , and an idea which is not perceived can
■ e
not bring another Idea into the mind* Moreover*
lines and angles of vision are hypothetical and
unknown, to the common man or to children* who
nevertheless can make sudden judgments of distance
6
with sufficient accuracy*, Even if lines and angles 
of vision had a real existence and the mind could 
perceive them directly * we could not judge distance 
by using them* for a necessary connection does not
7
exist between them and distance*
5X. 129.
4X, 133.
5X. 129, 131, 133.
6I. 131, 134.
7I. 131.
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Since distance is suggested to the mind through
8the mediation of some other idea or ideas f it is
necessary to examine what ideas attend.vision in
o
order to find out .what ideas suggest distance*
She ideas which attend the perception of -distance
are discovered to he first# convergence* the sensation
produced by the convergence of the pupils upon- the, .
object* and second* confusion#, Bear objects are
10confused and -far objects are diftinet* Confused 
vision ia« produced when the rays do not unite on the 
retinai^
knowledge of near distance through convergence 
depends upon associations learned by experience^ 
and not upon - angles nor upon a necessary connection
between convergence and distance#^ The sensation 
which arises from the 'Msum of the eyes11 is Immediately
SX* 128-9*
0
1# 131#
10*< i3S*
*%, 143*
1-0T.. *1 -W i®  .
13 '
1* 33*
14I. 153.
pereeived* end various degrees of It are associated
with different distances*^ While angles are
■formed* w© do mot apply them to the interpretation
of convergence, he cause they are never seen end
16conse(guontly can not be used* Our knowledge
of distance drawn from the sensation of convergence
depends* then* not on necessary connection but upon'
2J7experience of constant associations-*
Similarly* knowledge of distance through
confusion of the image comes through association
18
rather than from a necessary connection* To
prove this Berkeley notes that to a purblind
person a greater confusion suggest a a greater
distance because of the abnormal associations
19
furnished in repeated present at ions* One idea
20suggests another when constantly attending- it* Thus 
we judge distance from confusion by learning that a
15I. 13E,
16
I. 140*
17
I. 133* 140*
18 _X* lo4*
iq
I* 143*
20- .X* 134*
confused object may be seen distinctly by straining
the ©ye and the degree of strain necessary to produce
2%r
a distinct image gives us the distance* " The eon* 
nectlon between confusion and nearness is learned 
by their constant presentation together so that from 
the presence of one we infer the other just as we 
infer shame from seeing a blush*
That we see far objects as confused and near ones 
as distinct when viewed by reflection from a speculum* 
indicates only that the judgment is not made by
25
angles and lines but by arbitrary signs* The mind 
sees confusion and annexes to it a certain distance 
regardless of the causes of the confusion* the dis* 
tance taken depending on. past experience which* 
according to Berkeley, was ignored by Barrow when 
he set up this objection#
Wot only is there no necessary connection 
between distance and convergence or confusion* but 
also the "particular number * also* kind* etc*" of
21I. 134.
2S1, 66, 67, 134.
X* 141*
24I. 143-4
visible things which are need to contribute to frame 
cot idea of distance #fhavc none of them, In their
05own nature* any relation or connection%ith distance*
‘The only connection is that learned through experience#
A man bom blind and suddenly made to see would
have no idea of distance* and all objects would be
simply new sensations as near to him as nhis passions
36and the inmost thoughts of his mind**
For that matter* those who are not blind do
not necessarily think that what they see is outside
37them or at -a distance* ' For color is in the mind
as everyone admits and* since the visual extension
appears as near as Its- color* and since motion
end figure are in the same place- as extension* then
what we see is not necessarily thought to be outside 
28
110*
We never see the distance of visible things*
For example* X do not ever see the distance of the 
visible moon for at mother distance the original
25I* 135.
S6I. 146.
p7
- 1* 38, 70, 85* 146*
I* 146*
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29appearance has vanished#
(b) How We Bee Distance
If we- never gee distance then hew do we
come to know 'the significance of visual cues?
Berkeley explains thati
.^Having of a Ions time experienced certain 
Ideas perceiveable by touch - as distance * 
tangible figure* and solidity *- to have 
been connected with certain ideas of sight* 
I do* upon perceiving these ideas of sight* 
forthwith conclude what tangible ideas are* 
by th© wonted course of nature, like tofollow."30
We - Interpret visual sensations In terns of the
tactual sensation© which we have learned accompany
them* for the ideas of space or outness are no
more the object of vision than of hearing* By
variations in the noise made by the horses we
are able to tell the distance of a coach* Tot we
31
would not say that we hear the distance * for
we are not apt to confuse Ideas of sound with those 
32 . .
of touch* But we -no more see and feel the same
29I. 147-8.
SO.
31
32
I# 140 
I** 149# 
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m33thing than w© hear and feel the ©am© thing*
According' to Berkeley, then, w© do not see 
distance hut we feel it directly#. Obviously the 
notion’that we feel the w outness1* ot  objects by the 
sense of touch is inconsistent with the theory that 
all ideas are in the mind* As previously suggested, 
Berkeley1 a reason for falling to show that the 
tactual object la no more external than the visual 
object is the fact that here, in uh© theory of Vision f 
he is attempting, to show how we interpret visual 
stimuli in terns of distance and does not wish to 
complicate the issue by denying at the same time the 
externality of the objects of touch* Once one has been 
shown that the visual object is in the mind he may 
he led more easily to believe in the Intemallty of the 
tactual object as well*
te) factual Distance Is Prior 
Berkeley states that there- are two types of 
object s apprehended by the eye, the one mediately 
and the other Immediately* fhe first type consists
SSI. 150*
40
of objects which are suggested by the eye but are 
not seen since they are interpreted as of a tangible 
character and at a tangible distance* 'fhe second type 
of object is the purely visual appearance which "is 
neither near nor far.34
there is only one ultimate source for our ideas' 
of distance or outness, and that is the sens© of touch* 
However, turning to a further analysis of space and 
extension we find that there are two kinds of extern** • 
si on because there are two sources,, that is, visible 
and tangible ideas* Visible -and tangible extension 
are not the asm© thing, because we never see and feel 
the asm© object*^ $&© confusion of' thinking that 
the object' of the two is the, same arises because the 
Combination of visible ideas goes by the same name 
as the combination of tangible ideas* Moreover, 
secondary ^derivative1* ideas often affect us so 
strongly that it is difficult to distinguish them from. 
Immediate ideas* lust as we seem to hear thoughts, 
though we only do so mediately, so we seem to see
54
I. ISO*
(ZR *
^1* 150.
41
space though it is only through interpretatioxi* ^
factual space Is given priority then over visual
space* When Berkeley says that we know tactual
distance or outness immediately*. he evidently refers
to the kinesthetic sensations produced by reaching.
out to touch an external object or by moving toward
/
it* But he fails to distinguish between tactual and 
kinesthetic sensations* both of' which would be neces­
sary to get an - idea of outness# fhe tactual sense 
alone would no more give direct knowledge-of-distance 
than would the visual# . Xt is clear! moreover* that 
tactual sensations could be interpreted in terms of 
visual space Just as well as vice, versa#. It is also 
worth noting that if* with Berkeley* we admit that 
the objects of sight and touch are different* then 
the objects of touch differ from those of the kin­
esthetic sense and* just as we never touch the same 
object that we ace* so we never touch the object 
toward which we move*
36_
1# 150-1#
S7I. 77.
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{&) Distance Between feints
ta the foregoing discussion I have summarised
Berkeley1'© treatment of the perception of space
as outness or distance from the observer* Distances
between objects which lie'in a line at right angles
to the optic sjtie are not discussed directly*
Such distances are said to consist of the number
*20
of points between two points#' However, distances 
of this sort, the space between objects, majr be 
comprehended under the discussion of the perception.
' of magnitude* fhe perception of these spaces presents 
no problem not discussed under that head#
(©} Magnitude
Magnitude, like distance, is known neither through
the use of visual angles, for these are never seen,
tier through the use of angles 'in conjunction with
distance for distance is never seen -■ all things being
39
at an equal distance, visually# ' *he?e are two 
sorts of magnitude, visual and tactual, composed
I* 11*
39
1* 7 2 , 7 4 , 1S2*
respectively of visual and tactual Ideas* ^  these 
ideas are ^minima sensibil±a% the smallest thing that 
can he perceived visually and the smallest that can be 
perceived taetoually.41 From visual magnitude we can
determine tactual magnitude through the application, of
past experience, tactual magnitude being prior* % js#
when we apeak of magnitude we mean tactual or tangible
magnitude, for visual magnitude is always changing as
we draw near or move away and has n o  f i x e d  determinate
greatness*4^ Abstract magnitude, of course. Is never
known by virtue of the acme arguments as for abstract 
43space* ^
Berkeley shows how we can. infer tangible magnitude 
from visible magnitude by noting what Introduces 
the idea of greater or less into our thoughts when 
we look at an object*. Vision gives us several cue35 
visible magnitude, degree of vigorousness or faintness, 
degree of distinctness or confusion, the figure, 
number, and situation of intermediate objects, and
40**..........
I* .152*
41X* 153*
■42I* 153#
r
43I, 187-190*
the disposition of the eye ** in .short the seme cues 
which permit us to judge distance %  vision*4^
We toow the magnitude of objects by vision 
through the experienced association between these
cues and tangible' magnitude or 'bigness rather them.
<x% *through any necessary connection*. A person b o m
blind and made to see would not be able to judge the
magnitude of objects by sight because he would ■not
<&0
have experienced the association of these cues*
fbna* tangible magnitude is inferred from vis-*
ible cues in the same way that we infer tangible
distancej, that is* through straining the eye* vivid-*'
ness* confusion*and the situation of visible points
as high or low in accordance with, whether they are 
47far or near* '
***, 73, 3.33-4*
45
X* 154-5*
46I. 73, 167*
47
I. 165-6.
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it) Motion
We are apt to confuse visual with tangible motion,
but actually these have no common object and their
48
connection is known only through experience# We
coordinate the signs of the two motions and determine
tangible sot ion from visible cues Just as we do with 
49magnitudes*. Motion in the abstract is a fiction
50in common with other abstractions#
Cg} Situation 
Situation, like distance and motion, may be
51known through visual experience interpreted tactually*
That objects reflected upside down on the retina are
seen right 'side up can be explained only if it la
assumed that visual' and tactual ideas‘are not directly 
59connected, " Moreover, one bora blind and made to see
would have to learn associations with tangible space
S3
by experience before knowing visual up and down*
i'iTirwi.:"r :irrrj—i-:n• r~_\— r-ni -i-—— - "-,■■—■■...................... . ...r— ■^■■^ —      ,    .
48I. 195.
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51X. 176,
521, 183-4.
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Because the situation o f objects is determined 021X7 
by their relation to objects of the seme sense* all 
visual objects are in the mind and hence are all 
equidistant fram.any tangible object which exists
54
outside the mind, or rather they are at no distance#.
Ch> %guh©
Visual and tangible figure have no necessary
connection and. are associated only through experience*
66
for* because figure Is the termination of magnitude
and 210 visible magnitude can of itself suggest a
tangible magnitude, no visible figure can of itself
suggest a tangible figure# What appears rough may
feel smooth# A picture of many colors gives only
one touch sensation#5*7 Moreover, in the first act
of vision -of one born blind and made to see, no
tangible thing could be identified or located by sight*
We can, of course, have no idea of abstract figure
69
separate f r o m visible or tangible magnitude**'
54
X# 130, 182, 105# Notice that Berkeley is still 
speaking of an external tactual object* this is set 
straight in the Principles* 1# 280#
5 5I, 197*
5 6I* 178*
571. 179*
58
I* 179* 181.
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Visible and Tangible Extension
Berkeley holds that there ts no object coupon 
to both touch and sight*2- la every body there are 
two extensions ** the risible and the tangible.# 2 
Furthermore there is no necessary connection between 
risible and tangible extension*
(a) Visible Extension Differs From Tangible 
In the Oonsaomplaee Book Berkeley considers the 
difference between tangible and risible extension in 
a number of notes* By extension he here refers to 
the extension of body* The distance or space between 
bodies would be interpreted in terms of the extension 
of a body sufficient to occupy the space in question* 
Extension is a %ode of some tangible or sensible 
quality according as it is- seen or felt# tl^ On this 
ground we may distinguish between visible and tangible 
extension# ~
1X, 177-8, 184, 190, 194*
2I. 62,
sI* 4* Berkeley is apparently using the term “mode* 
in the sense given It by locko*
4
I* 11*
48
Since visible extension Is proportional to
tangible extension and* like the latter* la
^encreated and diminished by part am the two are
5commonly taken for the same#- This confusion is
©explained by the laws of the association of Ideas*
But the two extensions are entirely different* for
there are two sorts of bignessi first* the proportion
of one visual appearance to- other such appearances
given at the seme time* which is ^proportional to
angles* or if a surface* to segments of sphaerleal
Tfsurfaces** and second* tangible bigness*
Several reasons are given to show that the two
extensions are different s
Cl) There is no proportion for all men and at
S
all times between a visible and a tangible inch#
{2} If the two extensions were the same* then
one who had never seen M s  limbs would know their
9
visual length*
Sl. 61,
6I. 75,
7I. 74,
SI» 61-2*
Q
01*
40
(3) ¥ialble extension »  not bo imagined or 
conceived added to tangible extension and hence 
they at*#' heterogeneous*
(4) 0a# may say ttoat an object viewed at a 
distance seems as large as when -close although 
the visual appearance Is mailer so it smxot he a 
different M od of extension that is referred to#**
(63 What is smooth to the touch may he othor**- 
wia# to -the sight and vice versa** 8
(6 ) there is no necessary eomeotion between 
visible and tangible Ideas*
tte) Ho Heeessary Connection Between. Visible and
tangible Extension
Severn% arguments are given to show that there 
is no necessary connection between visible and tangible 
extension# ffee- principal ones -are thm following#
Cl) If our eyas had'a different range of vision 
extending to tlay particlest the. touch would not be 
coordinated with the visual sensation and no association 
between the two could be set tip**®
q » tn  i * m  l i^ w . i  *  f  WT l  W T ^ I  i f  »n n ^ a w i . l W S m i w g  t w o t i^  » » i.n i i t >< i i« i  r  >j i w * l g i  j i * i f t l * i i w a y
102 # eg *
1 1I# 66*
12X. 77*
13X. 196.
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{2 )  Mot only might the associations between
visible and tangible ideas have been different from
what they are now, but lesser tangible ideas might
even conceivably have- been associated with greater
tangible ones* For -example, even and or present
conditions, a small faint object is thought bigger
< 14
than a large clear one,
(3) We do not perceive the tangible magnitude 
of objects immediately by sight n o r do we perceive 
their si so 'by the mediation of anything that- has a
•f. Mf15
necessary connection with them as already shown#
* i  £•
(4) We see only colors - nothing, external# ~
T h e r e f o r e  t h e  judgments of the magnitude of distant
objects arise from custom and not from a necessary
connection that has been observed between ideas of
17
sight and touch#
14
X# 151#
15I. 157,
16
If 166,
1 7 I, 156, 158,
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(eJ tangible Extension Prior To Visible 
1 hair© eaM that Berkeley makes tangible extent- 
si 021 prior to visible* In the T^heory of Vis ion he 
states that this priority Is based on utility*- things 
that touch us may hurt and therefore we use our eyes to 
'predict when an object will touch us and what Its 
effect will be* and this prediction is based on con­
stant association in experience* Knowledge of the 
tangible object is more useful and hence we attend 
principally to tangible figure and magnitude*^
By applying this notion we may answer a question 
which Berkeley propounds but does not answer explicitly: 
S^osr comes it that, visible and tangible qualities
being different* they yet have the same name to all 
19languagebw? fheir association through utility would 
provide a satisfactory answer in terms of this pragmatic 
view*
Berkeley thinks that visible magnitude is -ex­
tremely unreliable of itself# it man ten feet away is 
thought as great as a man five feet awayf which is
on
true for. tangible but not for visible extension*
IQ
2* 254-5,
19I. 60,
Vi? ' a# *» fp#I# 155*
*62
Indies and feet are stated lengths whereby -we measure 
objects and estimate their magnitude# We us© tangible 
feet rather than visual because the latter are- hot 
of any determined magnitude as shown by the fact that 
at different distances they contain different numbers 
of minima sensibliia, and consequently have a different 
©^tension* to Inch and a foot seen from different dis­
tances have the same visible magnitude#^ A tangible 
inch# however* Is so long and no l o n g e r . I t  always 
haa the same number of minima-.
Ihere are at least two difficulties here# First* 
what Berkeley calls a tangible foot is apparently 
a complex idea got from a combination o f tactual- 
and kinesthetic ideas* Berkeley* of course* regards 
it as an idea got from touch alone* But we might 
argue* as already suggested* that w© never feel the 
object which we go up to and touch* In fact* at a 
distance w© know nothing about the tangible object 
since it is unperceived* Strictly speaking* it 
would be ridiculous to refer to the tangible figure 
or majpiltude of an object ten feet away*
S1X. 156.
po
I. 204.
53
Second* it seems unreasonable tmt, simply 
because the sense of sight is more versatile than 
that of touch* we Should consider the former 
secondary to the latter in importance* From a 
logical point of view* a quality dependent for its 
existence on the relation of two sensed or sensory 
ideas is equally dependent upon both and neither 
is prior* Consequently 1 may know the. extension of an 
object directly neither by merely looking at It nor 
by merely touching it* It is. only by combining either 
of these senses with the kinesthetic sense that X may 
find its distance or its magnitude or figure*
For that matter', it is only because we have the 
capacity of locomotion which- is revealed by kSn.es- 
thesis* that the stationary visual, object has more than 
one appearance* If wo could not move we would think 
that the visual object had only one appearance just as 
we assume the tangible object to have ohly one*
However, a re&nalysls could be made easily, 
giving kinesthesia a place in Berkeleyf s system*
It is thoroughly possible that in saying that tangible
54
extension and the tangible object are prior
Berkeley me ana only that, from a mechanical stand-*
)
point* they a re  more easily used as standards of
>j
measure* Time when Berkeley remarks that the true
object of geometry is tangible extension he explains
that men measure altogether by the application of
0*2
tangible extension to tangible extension* °
{&) Minima
Several references have been made to minima*, ■
A summary of what Berkeley says of these units of 
sensation will bring us to a consideration of the 
character and composition of extension#
A minimum sensibile is that ttheroin there
0 4 .
are not contained distinguishable sensible parts*
I n  regard to extension there are two types of minima, 
the T,M*t£*t? or minimum tan&ibile and the fM*Y*n or 
mintoum vfaihfls.* '
fho initials' alone.-are used to designate these 
two different ih the Commonplace Book.- and
X# _201-5* 
24I, 10. 
25I, xi.
A* 0» Fraser to M s  notes interprets as ^Matter
Tangible" and M.V. as "Hatter Visible",26 It
seems certain that Berkeley meant % t o £ m 8 and 
not ^matter” ♦ For instances he asks w^hether a 
13*?.* he of any color On© would hardly apeak of
%  matter visible*1* Moreover the terms M*f * and 
H*V** as well as M*S* which Fraser translates 
as flatter Sensible”* are introduced by Berkeley 
to notes which state that the M*B* is the basic
<50
element to an extension#'’" ' As will be shown* the
ultimate elements of extension are said to
either risible or tangible* Berkeley would object
strongly to the statement that extension is eom~
posed of %atter visible81*.
On© 13*3** according to Berkeley* is no
29larger than another « the else is fixed* All
M*V*1 s are of the same sise^®* even for different
SIpersons # and would be the seme In size even for a
56
person with microscopic eyes*®3 However, It is
impossible to compare the M*?* with the M*f*# even ■ 
though they are both %ext to nothing”, because they are 
Ideas of different senses*.^5
Berkeley1© concern with the M*S* doubtless 
arises from an attempt to analyse carefully lock©Vs 
■"simple idea o f extension”, which Is a similar leadb 
sensible point* *£hie clone successfully, ideas of 
different extensions could he built up from the repet­
ition o f sensible points Just as was done by Locke* 
Sometimes Berkeley refers to Hie M*S* as a 
^nunotum senalbile” or sensible point* A lino Is con­
ceded by geometers to be made up of points* 'But
54are we to take points In the Buclidean sense?
Berkeley holds that the true def Iniflon of a point
is that it is an H*S** V m  of this definition, ho
elates, eliminates from- mathematics the absurdities
which arise because the senses are despised by
65mathematicians* For mathematicians speak of points
3 3I, 41* 62. 
5 4I, 27*
W X. 64*
mas unimaginable and this produces fallacies* for there 
can be no- true-reasoning about thingd of which we haire 
no idea* ihis leads Berkeley to an attach, upon the 
then' current .mathematical, notion of extension with 
particular reference to infinitesimals*
mMathematical Space and Extension
The OanSiionclace Book and the essay Of. Infinites 
contain a steep criticism of the notions of the 
infinite divisibility and infinite largeness of 
extension and space assumed by mathematics* Berkeley 
has two particular reasons for showing that there 
are no infinitesimals* First,, only by so doing 
can he establish the existence of an ultimate, 
indivisible unit from which the ideas of various 
extensions and spaces may be built up* Second, he 
wishes to eliminate false notions of space and e»* 
tension through mathematical misconceptions*. %  
a more general sense this be canes an attack on the 
assumptions underlying Ilewtonlan mathematics, the 
theory of fluxions, which made possible for Newton 
the mathematical analysis which fomed an important 
grouhd ©f M ©  physical theory*
(a) Infinite Divisibility Impossible 
Berkeley tells us that the M*F# and. the M*T* are 
the least divisible parts of the extensions which they 
compose*. They are- the smallest things of which we 
can have an idea because they are least peroepbibles
59
and hence are simple and have no parts# Experience 
teaches us that they exist 9 for they are the least 
things we can see and feel# Moreover* every argument 
against the existence of such Indivisibles goes on 
some false assumption*^
On the other 'hand* several arguments may be ad­
duced to show that infinitesimals are Impossibles
(1) We have no ideas of infinitesimals and*
sine# to be is to be perceived* they do not exist*
2therefore there can be no reasoning about them*
{ 2 ) Infinite divisibility supposes the external 
existence of extension* but the latter is false and 
hence the former also* no idea being external to the 
mind* ^
(3) Demonstrations of infinite divisibility 
suppose the existence of abstract, extension - length 
without breadth or invisible length* The latter is an
A
absurd and false notion and hence the former is also*
1x. 13*
2
I* 9*
1* 69*
X, 59, 76.
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(4) ?*hat has an infinite number of parts
must he infinite# If a given extension is infinitely
divisible it will be infinite in extent, which is a
Scontradiction#
(8) A minimum vislblle can not be made.up of 
Infinitesimals for they are invisible and invisibles 
are nothings and can not exist# ^ Such a notion would 
be a self-contradiction# fhat which la visible can not
7
be made up of invisibles#.
(6) According- to the doctrine of infinite div­
isibility a rose at an infinite distance would have 
some smell* fhls is absurd*3
(b) Infinite hargeneas Impossible 
Examination shows that infinite largeness, like 
infinite divisibility, Is impossible because un­
intelligible .and self-contradieboryi
{%) Our ideas of extension are neither way capable 
of infinity, as anyone may try by examining the contents
€f
of his mind*'
6
I* 13.
71. 10* 
8I. 57. 
9I. 63.
( 2 )  ninfinite quantity n has no moaning*- ihen
wo use the tern we mean either a finite quantity or
10
else nothing at all* Magnitudes are- definite* 
hut pure infinite space is indefinite and ahsurd,^
{3} Infinite space* even assumed as necessarily 
existing* is not imaginable without motion and is
tpthus limited and relative*
(4 ) M l  absurdities produced by the notion of 
infinite space are unnecessary* because if we abandon 
the notion the absurdities disappear and the 'idea of 
finite spaces and extensions will serve all the de­
mands of reason and. utility*3^
In short* then* there can be no absolute space 
or extension* because these supposed entities are 
particularly- characterised by infinity of both sorts* 
Absolute* infinite space* is impossible because .it 
can not. be imagined* because it is self-contradictory, 
and because its locus and its qualities are incompat­
ible with both reason and experience-;# Ihere is no 
external* infinitely divisible* -and -infinitely large 
space#
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(o) Meaning of Infinite
In any ease, ^infiniteft Is an ambiguous tern,
and whatever determined meaning Is assigned to it
produces difficult lea* For example:
tl) If by an infinite extension its m em one too
small or too- great to comprehend, that is a con- 
14
tradlction*
12)  I f  by an Infinite extension we mean one 
consisting, of innumerable points,, that Is a contra** 
diction, for points, lfthof never so .many, may be 
numbered'** ^
( B l wIf yon call infinite that web" is greater 
than any assignable by another* then there may be 
an infinite square, sphere, or any other figure* 
which Is absurd*3-®
Blnoe we have no idea' of infinitesimals, our
t  ♦
ideas of extension must be composed of minima« 
either visible or tangible* ¥tfhe *1 * * & 111,1
& ****** &e# of time are to be cast away and neglected,
* » 1*7as so many noughts or nothings * Extension would
be treated in similar fashion* Visible extension,
ISthen, is ffa continuity of visible points** ■
14I. 15* 16* 18I* 63.
151. 15*
16X, 9*
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(d) Irrora of Abstract Mathematics
Berkeley attacks not only the existence of
mathematical absolute space and extension but shows
that mathematics as applied to finite, extensions
and spaces attributes false characteristics to
them* Much confusion arises from the fact that
arithmetic and geometry discuss the relations of
number end figure before knowing the true nature of
IBthese objects* Moreover* mathematicians* like
others* are deceived by the supposition that abstract*
general ideas are possible* and that these ideas are
copies of entities outside of and independent of 
19
the mind*
As an abstract science arithmetic is silly* 
Berkeley insists# It is only Intelligible when 
practical* when dealing with finite ideas applied 
to particular things* for numbers are only names 
and by themselves stand for nothing* Unity * for 
example* in the abstract la no Idea nor the name 
of an idea but simply an empty worcU^® In arithmetic
64
21
we regard not the tiling but only the signs# Math**
22
ematics deals with signs and not with Ideas, with
33numbers which are mere names and represent no ideas#
It is a *dpeeulatlire'n study which has as its object 
no intelligible things, no ideas, and which %akes
04
toots on purpose to untie them** Ihose things
which pass for abstract truths and theorems hare
meaning only in so far as they are conversant with
25
particular, numerable things#
(e) Faults of Geometric Extension
Similarly, the lines of **purew geometry are
insensible and meaningless nonsense# Since they are
insensible, we have no idea of them and hence can
26
not discuss them intelligibly# Ihey are insensible
because they attempt to represent general and abstract
Ideas and such ideas have been shown to be impossible#
27
Hence much of the confusion In mathematics*
21I# 76,
22I* 50
25I# 47 
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I* 19, 56* 
I* 326 
X. 14 
I* 7*
The object of geometry then is not pure space
01* external extension considered in the abstract*
ttOur ideas we call figure & extension* not images
of the figure and extension of matter| these (if
such there be) being infinitely divisible, those 
2&
not bo*w The proper object of geometry is apace
or extension considered as particular and finite
and dependent upon the mind* Considered as
applying to absolute apace and extension it is a
delusion* simply a system of names which refer to
nothing* This, positivistie attitude doubtless
stems from lockeVs discussion of 'the meaning and
function of words*
Certain errors about the nature of extension
arise from the geometer1 s assumption of the existence
of external objects* for the figures of geometry are
commonly assumed to exist outside the mind* But it
has been shown that no idea exists outside* the mind
and hence lines can not exist outside as properties
30of an external matter*
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Because of this assumption* when arithmetic
is used in geometry* certain contradictions appear#
Mathematicians should recognise that geometry is
a %ixt mathematics” applying arithmetic and algebra 
51
to points* Berkeley Is here protesting against 
the tendency of science to assume that the universe 
is renderable completely in terms of an a priori 
mathematical system*^
(f) Errors Made By Geometers 
The major error about extension that arises from 
assuming the existence of external objects is that 
of attributing: Infinite divisibility to finite extension* 
While infinite divisibility is not expressly stated* 
yet it is ^everywhere supposed* and thought to have 
so inseparable and essential connexion with the- prin­
ciples and demonstrations in Geometry that mathematicians 
never admit- it into doubt*
Mom if it can be shown that no finite extension 
contains innumerable parts* something about the nature 
of extension will be determined and* at the same time*
31I. 12, 47.
SS1, IS*
»*. 327,
mcertain contradictions in geometry will be cleared up# 
Some of the errors referred to are* for example* the 
following, which arise from an erroneous notion of 
the object of geometry $
(X) that there are surds* leaXXy there are none#
(2) That the diagonal of a square is incommen­
surable with the side* Actually this is not so al­
though Berkeley expresses seme doubt about this when 
he first mentions it#^s
(3) That two lines have a mean proportional#
This is not always so for it depends upon the number
36of points in each line*
(4) The Pythagorean theorem*. This is false as 
shown by the fact that all lines can not be divided 
into equal parts* ¥Jh©ther a line may be so divided 
depends on whether it contains ©n even number of 
points*
(5) That a circle can not be squared* Particular
33-.1* 52*?
^S. 14.
3SI. 60, 78*9.
36
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circles m m  be squared if they contain the proper
58
number of points* Berkeley gives no direct descrip­
tion of how to square a circle but says that If one
can be squared arithmetically it is squared geometrl-- 
59eally*, apparently he means that a circle made up 
of a number of points equal to a perfect square could 
easily be squared if we knew the- number of points*,
(6) fhat a finite line is infinitely divisible#
But geometry does not prove that this is possible*^® 
Bow can a line composed of a definite number of points 
bo divided to infinity?
All these errors come from assuming the Infinite 
divisibility of finite extension# Moreover* certain 
direct contradictions come from the same assumption, 
for example 5
(1) Seme .geometers hold that a line may be divided 
into infinitesimals and that these in turn may be 
divided infinitely * infinitesimals of a second order* 
If this were so, an inch would have an infinity of an
mAp
infinity of am infinity ©te* of partss*.-
(2) Bam- hold that all inflnltestaalo below 
the second order are nothing at all* But they are then 
obliged to hold that in soma aetee f%he square* cube* 
or other power of a positive real root* should Itself 
he nothing at ail1* which is absurd*
Cg) Finite Extension lot Infinitely- Mvfafbl© 
lot oontent with falsely assigning infinite 
divisibility to a non-existent l?mathsmatioal,T apace* 
geometry erroneously supposed finite extensions to 
he infinitely divisible* 1 have dealt with Berkeley'1© 
denial of the possibility of infinite divisibility 
in general* that there Is no smh thing mm m part 
infinitely amall or an infinite twmhm of parts 
contained In any finite quantity is shown by the 
following arguments i
Cl) Brory particular finite exfeensim which, may 
possibly he the object of thought is an idea existing 
in the mind and only in. the stud* and each part of 
the extension met be perceived for otherwise it
42
I* SSI*
4S1« 331.
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would have no existence in th© mlnd*^5 fhus it 
follows that j
(A) If we ar© unable to perceive innumerable 
parts in any finite extension# then it is certain
■ 4A
that they are not combined In it#
( 3 )  Since we do find that we are unable to 
distinguish innumerable parts in any particular line# 
surface, or solid, therefore no finite extension Is 
infinitely divisible#^
( 2 ) If# by finite extension is meant something 
different from a finite idea# then we do not know what 
it can be# But if the terms extension# parts# etc* 
are taken in any sens© conceivable# that is# for 
ideas# then to say %  finite quantity or extension, 
consists of an infinite number of parts* is a 
contradiction*
(3) People who believe in abstract ideas may
reasonably believe that extension in the abstract.
is infinitely divisible#^ But we teve shown.
45
* X* 327*8*
461. 327.
47I. 328.
48I, 328.
that abstract ideas arc inconceivable#
(4) People who believe that the objects of
sense exist outside the mind may# in virtue, thereof#
admit that a line an inch long may contain innumerable
50
parts really existing although too small to discern#
But we have shown that the objects of sense are in the
mind' alone# ^Infinite divisibility of' extension deep
suppose. external existence of extension^ but the
latter is false# ergo ye former also# n
i S ) If finite lines are. .infinitely divisible there
BPcan be no such thing, as a point#.'
In brief# it. is on the assumptions noted, in 
points #5 and #4 that the arguments for infinite 
divisibility of finite extension are based#. ‘These 
having been proved false# the notion is untenable#
(h) How the Geometers Fall Into Error 
Berkeley gives an explanation of how it cornea 
about that geometers mistake the number of points 
in a line for an infinite number# When a line is 
used to represent a much longer extension and is
72
spoken of as containing, for example* a thousand parts 
although it really contains much fewer* {as in drawing 
a scale diagram) people forget to retain the distinction 
and easily slide into the belief that the particular 
line really has a thousand parts*thereby they get 
the notion that* since a irery short line may have a 
thousand parts* it may e v e n have an infinite number*
But the only true use for u^niversal** ideas in geom­
etry fts when a particular line stands, for innumerable
others of different sisea* which are considered
64abstracted from their magnitude* So to -consider 
a theorem as universal we must speak of the line 
on paper as containing parts which it actually does 
not contain# But we can. not imagine an inch itself 
being infinitely divisible or consisting of a thousand 
parts. ^  Whs line simply stands for the idea of a 
larger line* Whereas for a line to be infinitely 
divisible It must be infinitely great*
55I. 3S0-1.
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(£> How Geometry Is Nevertheless Practical 
How if the geometers have been involved in 
error and -deceived in their notion of the true 
object of geometry and the Infinite divisibility 
of extension* how is it that they have made such 
practical progress? ? M s # says Berkeley* is be­
cause whatever in geometry is useful remains true 
when extensions are considered as containing only 
a finite number of parts* Berkeley promises to 
demonstrate this in detail in another place but
57
fails to do so* There he is to show how to 
measure lines without assuming the infinite divisi­
bility of finite extension* Perhaps the method 
of measure he proposes (and we may take measure here 
to m e m  all gome trie operations00) is that indicated 
in the Commonplace Bopk*. Shat is* to measure lines
we have simply to count the minima which compose 
59
them*
*
According to Berkeley geometers only appear 
to use infinitesimals anyway* They seem by the use of
Fraser thinks that Berkeley Is referring to fart 11 
of the ffrinelnlea*. which never appeared*
58 '
X* 48*
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Infinitesimals to solve problems that would be
otherwise insoluble* But not only is it unnecessary
to use inf ini t ©slmls .in solving these problems,
but it is even impossible to solve them to this 
60maimer*
Even to. fluxions we neither conceive nor need
to conceive toftoltesimals* W© have seen that It is
impossible to conceive or. imagine anything leas
than a minimum ssnalbile*^ Hence accuracy beyond
minima la a waste because it is meaningless*^ to
infinite of even the first degree is a ^mere nothing1*
1/iOOOth  o f an inch is nothing because it. represents
nothing but, when an inch is used to represent a mile
then l/1000th of an inch represents 1/lOOOth of a
mile which is an imaginable idea and hence is not 
64
nonsense* When we speak of infinite quantities
/2C
we mean either finite ones or else nothing at all*
€QI, 352.
61 „„„
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Actually geometers do not consider lines as 
mere distances abstract from other .qualities'as la 
shorn by their use of curved lines*^ Curves are 
incomprehensible unless we allow lines to bemad© 
tip of finite points for the attempt of geometers 
to consider'curves'as polygons is nonsense# -3?he 
lines of geometry then are really made up of irreducible 
points, minima aenalbllia* and the real business 
of geoemtry is simply demonstrating that lines 
are' equal or unequal and hence are to be called by 
the same or different names*^ fhe significance of 
the science depends upon the meaning of equality .
69
and mathematicians have avoided defining .this term*
*Th©y say* nQUa© eongrmmt sunt ae<paiia% but this is 
meaningless and unintelligible unless ^equal11. is 
defined* and a .system admitting the existence of
70
Infinitesimals can not make a satisfactory definition* 
And no word should b© used unless it represents an
71
idea*
But 4t  lines are made up of points* as we have shown*
then we may readily define equal lines as ones eon-
* 72taining the same number of points* and equal triangles
as ones containing the same number of points or minima
* 7*% senslbilla*'
Mathematical extension and space* then, are 
fictions because they assume the existence of 
external and abstract' space and extension and be­
cause they assume that finite extensions and spaces 
are infinitely divisible* all of which is .impossible*
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fhe latere of Space and J^ tenoloai
la) fte Mea of Bj&enaion 
Berkeley's extension ia built up- by the repoti*
■3.
t i< m  o f simple Maas of extension* that ia# minima*
2
without which there can be no Mam of a stated length# 
Intension consists of a fV&rl©ty of hom^emal thoughts 
co-existing without mixtureor *the collection or 
distinct coexistence of that -is* peresp**
Mens of sight and touch* fisrnl extension soots to 
he the- oo^ eacistanoe of colors |minte« points of
js
color) in the mind*, factual extension* the trm 
extension of bodies* ia a ^continuity of solid porta* 
and space la a *emblmlty of m a o L M  p a r t s A  
ninteum point, betas ® stable idea, is Indescribable.7
Boro is another algnlficanf similarity between Berkel#y#s 
theory and that of Looks#
%lm 81.
2
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But in the Cexmnonpiaee Book there is some suggestion 
that extension is not a simple Mea because it con­
tains three several ideas - length., breadth* and 
solidity.®
nevertheless* even a given extension seems to 
he a simple idea because it is unique and qualitatively 
different freest a simple collection of minima# '^hus 
Magnitude taken for co-exist ©nee and succession ia
o
not all divisible* tout is a simple idea#11 Apparently* 
however* in this passage* Berkeley Is referring to the 
magnitude of empty or absolute space and not that of 
particular finite extensions# fhat toeing the case* 
this notion of th© simplicity of magnitude when con­
sidered in one aspect* may he Introduced to- suggest 
that absolute space could not toe divisible and hence 
would toe useless to the role commonly assigned to it - 
that of providing- a background of reference for 
finite extensions# the context of the reference to 
quest ion suggests this#
8I, 65,
9I. 67,
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Elsewhere Berkeley definitely makes extension
a simple idea because * like ^power11 and Tfr©(l% it
10includes nno parts or relations1** Here be is 
evidently referring to the minima which compose an 
extension *■ locke1 s simple ideas of extension#
fjhab Berkeley sees difficulty in considering' 
an extension as a simple collection of parts is 
hinted in several other passages# l?w©lv© inches 
is not the same idea as a foot hut it is like a foot 
because they both contain the seme number of points#^* 
Apparently an extension is something more than the 
repetition of a number of points* It is unlikely 
that Berkeley would consider mere difference in name 
a legitimate .ground for distinction* Moreover* %e 
may think of a circle* or have its idea in our mind* 
without thinking of points*-**## -whereas it should 
seam the idea of a circle is not mad© up of the 
ideas of points1*#^ this disagrees with Berkeley* a 
theory of the Impossibility of abstraction or else 
with the theory that an extension is composed of points#
10I» 67* 
l:LI. 25*
IS "J* M
Bhoartainby la algo bm ptbbbbC in tlm mnsnewored
question "whether I4e&@ &t eatensicm are oede up pg
other ideas* o*g* the ties of a foot made up of
General fdaas of on inolirr* ^  Finally# Berkeley
motes that wtbo Maas w# tew by a itmaceaslw* curious
inspection of ye minute parts of a plain do not seem
to mate tip the extension of that plain vlcwf& & com**
3.4
sidorfd all. together** to interesting suggestion which 
If further developed* might clear n p tfcit 
ambiguity ia the notion there isay b# r?two kinds of 
visible extension ~ m m perceiv’d by a confused view* 
the otter by 0 distinct successive direction of the 
optlqmo oils to each pointC^fartraatoly Bortelof 
confines htesolf to the more flotation of this possibility 
St would m m  that Berkeley gave eaneldorable 
thought to b revision of teete10 analysis of extension 
into ydnim cm simple ideas tot failed to find a 
tterengbly satisfactory revision* It is worth 
noting that moat of Berteleyte unsolved object ions 
arc the sort that would be mode by am adherent of 
the dosteit theory of perception*
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Berkeley notes another difficulty in regard to
minima in the ffommoneiaee Book and nowhere attempts
to solve it* What color is a minimum? Can a
16minimum he green? ' fh© difficulty here would he
that green m s  considered to he a combination of
blue and yellow so that a green minimum would have
different parts, some blue and some yellow# if this
were so then it could not he a minimum for the
separate parts which were distinguishable would
he minima# Of course modem knowledge of the composition
of colors Indicates, that the real difficulty would he
to explain how w© can see yellow since it Is a
combination of red and green whereas green Is a
1*?primary color and hence simple* How we can see
green might he satisfactorily explained hut any color
mad© up of the combination of two colors would present
the original difficulty*
mother question suggested hut not answered is
"whether a M*V* he of any color? a M#T* of any
18tangible quality?r A more Interesting point 
16I* 17.
17The Ladd-Frsnklin theory would, of course, make yellow
also a primary visual response*
18X, 11.
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not cleared u p ia "whether a M*V« or a 11*1?'* he extended"*,
It la clear that a M*S* can not he a continuity of
part a for'the parts would he invisible and that
which ia visible can not he made up of Invisible 
20things* " &a Berkeley seems to he patterning M s  
idea of extension, after Locke the answer to this 
probably would be that a M*S* is to itself the primary 
idea of extension and anything composed of M*S*fs 
would have extension*- whereas to ask whether the 
M«S* itself has extension would be meaningless*
However* these details are simply mentioned to the 
Commonplace Book and are not discussed elsewhere* 
thus we are left with the fact that Berkeley1 a 
theory of extension as expressly stated is similar 
to Locke1 a to that extensions are made up of in­
describable minima of sight or touch* But what 
Is extension itself? We do not know the meaning 
of such words according to Berkeley* ^  If a given 
extension is-made up of points do these points 
have extension? If not* then the aggregate contains 
.r.| |.-...-T.:.1...^....               r, ■ n„-..7 —       -■    ,      , ■>     — *■—
19I. 79#
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something which the parts lack* if so, then the 
minima should he divisible# Do minima. then,have 
extension?^2 Berkeley does not answer this directly
23but he does note that simple ideas are incommunicable* 
ffl?hat being so, It aeems reasonable to suppose that 
Berkeley would consider that the essence of ex­
tension, that which the minima possess by virtue of 
which they compose extensions, ia something not sus­
ceptible of discussion* Bike time, ftSi non rogas
■pA
Intelligo"* We know the simple idea of extension 
directly and intuitively but we can not describe it*
(b) All Space is Belatlv©
I have discussed Berkeley * s attack on the not ion 
that absolute apace is necessary as a place for 
absolute motion* In De Motu it is shown that 
there can be no absolute space because the tern 
means nothing* Space without bodies existing would 
not be extended for apace without parts would not 
be extended and it can only have parts assigned to 
it in relation to body* . distance then becomes meaningless
22J, 62
p*z
I* 37, 68, 71# 
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munless it la tavern me that which wonM be occupied
by a body of a certain sit© and exposed of a
oe#ta!& aun&er of nJteinm. Bemalbtila* Without
either parts or todies there eouM be no space
osmm anything mm®pt %ao uoifpm nothing** 
to&gteo ail todies to the universe to I»fi toon 
destroyed and what rem&toa is sailed absolute apace 
which la without relations or ■ diet toptishtog character* 
Isitos# la attribute® - can he asslgnaa to It# m m  
its so-called extension can neither ho divided nor 
measured* It finds no place to the senses* or in 
tho toaglsmbion # or In the intellect* la short, it 
i® every way unrealizable in experience, so it is 
a mars w i  denoting nothing#1^
Berkeley has attacked ffewton.1® scientific object 
in so far as that 1© supposed to bo an absolute 
matter assisting in- absolute space sad exhibiting 
absolute motion* newton h S m m i t admitted that we ere 
limited to knowledge of objects relative to otur 
senses sad moving only relatively to relative space,
25t*# w*
86I* 820,
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but lie assumed* apparently gratuitously (if we except 
M s  proof of absolute motion), that the object with 
which science' deals, directly is in some sense a 
veridical representation of -an absolute mass moving 
against a background of absolute space*
Berkeley eliminates this world of material and 
special absolutes showing that the relation of 
our sensations to each other Is their only measure 
and reference* Observation gives us no knowledge 
of any external or absolute entity* Bewton postulates 
a mind observing empirical objects with which science 
deals directly but which refer to an absolute and 
unseen scientific object* Berkeley reduces this 
system to embrace only mind containing ideas whose 
only known or Intelligible relation Is with each other* 
Space then, for Berkeley, is relative to finite 
extension and finite extension Is dependent upon 
mind* f?$hat may be the extension, figure, and motion 
of anything really or absolutely, or In itself, it Is 
impossible to know, but only the proportion or 
relation they bear to our -senses* * *fhlngs remaining 
the,same, our ideas vary***All this scepticism 
follows from our supposing a difference between things 
and ideas* # *TtS*7
27I* 306,
(©) Summary of Bature of Space and Extension 
In his discussion of space and extension 
Berkeley has attempted to show that space is only 
to be interpreted In terms of the extension of body 
and Is hence relative, that both space and extension 
depend for their existence on the mind and therefore 
In a second sense have no absolute existence, that 
they do not exist external to. the mind or abstract 
from sensible qualities, that they do not possess the 
characteristic of Infinite divisibility commonly 
attributed to them by mathematics, and that their 
ultimate constituents are simple Ideas of extension 
and space which are got directly from the senses as 
minima sens lb ilia and which are not susceptible of 
• analysis or definition*
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God and Space
As previously mentioned# It is necessary to 
consider the possibility that in' Berkeley * s system 
space and extension may exist external to and In­
dependent of human minds through their being per­
ceived in some other mind such as that of God*
X will deal first with the discussion of this- point 
In the earlier writings and then with the treatment 
of the subject found 'in Slrla#
(a) God and Space in the Earlier Writings 
2a the foregoing discussion Berkeley seems to 
have been denying the existence of- a world of 
absolutes# Actually moat of the arguments are directed 
against the possibility of human knowledge of such 
a world# 2& fact, in, certain passages# 'Berkeley seems 
to speak as though absolutes really did exist# For 
example# he states that ^things perceived by sense 
may be termed external* with regard to their origin;
In that they are not generated from within by the mind 
itself# but are imprinted by a Spirit distinct from 
that which perceives them# fhls amounts to an
•'-‘-‘- -h i " n r i.iti r  r - r . T- t — f J  i t -  t -   |T„.    „t    a . ..... - - r ..........................................................
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admission that our sensations may have an external 
archetype in another mind* Indeed* Berkeley1 s proof 
of the existence of tod depends upon certain ideas 
being introduced into our' minds by tod for our 
knowledge of other spirits comes only from ff their 
operations or the ideas excited by them In us*.2 
How the archetypes of our sensations could exist 
only in some other mlnd^ and Berkeley states that 
^whether there are such ideas in the mind of tod and 
whether they may he called by the name of Matter* 1 
will not dispute* But 1 obi act to the notion of an 
unthinking substance as the support of extension**4 
But* following Berkeley1 a reasoning* todfs ideas 
must be inert and unthinking like our own- and it could 
well he that our ideas* or seme of them* are copies 
of tod'1 a Ideas* fhua the ideas of space and extension 
entertained by God could constitute a system of objects 
which* although dependent for their existence upon tod1 a 
mind* could serve as patterns for our human ideas of 
space- and extension*. Berkeley even tells us that 
the visual and tactual -signs of space and extension
2x. 312*
3I, 312.
4I. 300.
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8are nth o language of nature addressed to us by Grodrt.
External space# absolute in that it is independent -of ’human
minds* might exist In the mind of ®od*®
There are serious objections to this interpret**
stion* Certain of Berkeley1 s -arguments against
■absolute- and external space are cm purely rational
grounds# For example* infinite divisibility* which
seems to be considered, an essential characteristic
of -absolute space*. Is held to be self-centra&letory*
How'Berkeley has elsewhere stated that It Is not
possible even for an, infinite mind to reconcile
7
contradictory ideas# This should, effectively pre­
clude the possibility of G-odf s ideas of space being 
of a character to 'fulfill the requirements demanded, 
of absolute space by science# If infinite divisibility 
is self-contradictory^ then* even though we make ^od?B 
ideas of space absolute* those ideas will not include 
Infinite divisibility and the calculus Is applicable 
to nothing# On. the other hand* Berkeley remarks 
casually that infinite as applied to Ood means something
% *  200*
6
I* 170#
7
X* 330#
other than when applied-to men*® it even *r seems* * # * *
that the most comprehensive & sublime intellects
9see more m*v*fa at once” than we do# However,
this does not state clearly that Ood sees an infinite
number of M#V* *s or that God has an idea of infinite
space or extension*'
Berkeley remarks several times that we must
not attribute extension or space to God for fear
of identifying him with these supposed entities*
Such a notion would he highly dangerous, according
to Berkeley, because space is inert and God Is pure
activity**0 More, locke, Hobbes, Spinoza, and
Haphson are severly criticised for associating
11God with extension* ’ %ace and extension are 
dangerous attributes* One reason for denying ex­
ternality to space is that then either God would
12have a rival or else be extended*
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{b} Bod and Spaa© in Siria 
Birip was first published in 17449 some twenty- 
three years after the i latest of the other works 
discussed* and shows a new development in. Berkeley1 s 
theory# Here Bod1 a Ideas are spelled with the cap­
ital and are strongly Platonic since they are said 
to he wthe most real beings, intellectual and un­
changeable^ and therefore more real than the fleet­
ing* transient objects of sense which, wanting 
stability, can not be subjects of science* much less 
of intellectual knowledge1
Being, so far as Bod1© Ideas are concerned, 
apparently means intelligibility14* but Berkeley 
does not indicate of what this intelligibility is 
to—consist#— Moreover *r-th©re-is-the~suggestlw that-1 
we may have sot© notion, however vague, of Bod1 a 
Ideas for it is stated that the best human Intellect 
can by great exertion *&©&£& some imperfect glimpse 
of the Divine Ideas,, abstracted from all things 
corporeal, sensible and imaginable#
13III, 286
14
III. 285 
XXX* 286#
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Just aa to the Platonic system there ore two 
worlds, > so that If one carefully analyses and inquires 
and ^ascends fram the sensible world, ■and beholds things 
to a new light and a new order, he will then change 
his system* and perceive that, what he took for 
substances and causes are but fleeting shadows? that 
Mind contains all, and is to all created beings the 
source -of unity and Identity, harmony and order, 
existence and stability#
We have no definite statement that God has Ideas 
of space and time but the order of our spatial and 
temporal Ideas must be a reflection of the divine 
order which is beyond our intellects* Such a system
Ki
leaves room for the existence of some sort of a
\
space which, if not Independent of ntad, is at least 
Independent of human minds, and which bears the same 
relation to our Ideas of apace that the Bewtonlan 
absolutes bear to the objects of sense#
Bhf or tunctely, Berkeley does not fully develop 
this aspect of his theory to Girls and we are left 
without the possibility of definite conclusions*
16m ,  265*
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